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Abstract
The discussion over the relationship between what is true globally and what 
is true locally is not new.  It might be helpful, therefore, to consider issues 
surrounding the relationship between globalization and local values in light of  
previous forms of  this discussion.  To this end, I would like to reflect on the 
discussion of  context in the writings of  al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and al-Ghaza>li>. 
To focus this paper, I will consider only three issues, namely that of  history, 
science and the role of  reason in religion.  I will argue that al-Farabi and Ibn 
Sina present an account of  context that begins with experience as a foundation 
and then moves to the universal, emphasizing the importance of  tradition, 
demonstration and rationality.  Against these two, al-Ghaza>li> argues for the 
importance of  leaving behind experience in order to reach that which is certain, 
emphasizing the supernatural, intuition and mystical.  My goal is to draw out 
some implications these writers recognized followed from their often dense and 
esoteric discussions of  the nature of  particulars and universals, and conclude 
with some suggestions for our contemporary situation.
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A. Introduction
The disagreement between al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina on one side, and 
al-Ghaza>li> on the other can be understood as primarily a disagreement 
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about whether context is important for knowledge. Al-Farabi> describes 
the natural development of  knowledge, starting from particulars and 
developing into language, that only reaches certainty with theoretical and 
practical philosophy. For al-Farabi>, it is only the philosopher who has 
true knowledge because it is only the philosopher who sees the universal 
qualities lying within particular things. Ibn Sina provides a similar, 
though more metaphysical, account of  the development of  knowledge. 
Knowledge begins with sense perception of  particulars from which 
the rational soul abstracts universals. For Ibn Sina, then, it is only the 
philosopher who has true knowledge because it is only the philosopher 
who can establish the proper relationship between the practical intellect 
and the theoretical intellect. Both al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina agree that context 
is essential for knowledge in that knowledge must begin with experiences 
of  particular and individual things, and from this foundation develop a 
philosophical understanding that uncovers the universals which lie hidden 
within these particulars.
Against al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina, al-Ghaza>li> argues that this 
philosophy, with its reliance on experience of  particulars and a method 
of  demonstration, cannot provide the certainty that philosophers claim it 
does. Methodically working through the limitations of  sense perception 
and empirical demonstration, al-Ghaza>li> concludes that certainty cannot 
be had within any particular context, and so knowledge must therefore 
necessarily come from beyond context. Instead of  sense perception and 
experience of  particular things, al-Ghaza>li> argues for supernatural insight 
and prophecy. Instead of  empirical demonstration, al-Ghaza>li> offers the 
distributed knowledge of  the people. In the end, al-Ghaza>li> concludes 
that true and certain knowledge is not found with the philosopher but 
rather with the mystic.
While this disagreement involves important philosophical issues, 
I want to suggest that it also has significant implications beyond 
philosophical circles. al-Ghaza>li> acknowledged these implications and 
their significance, giving a number of  reasons for why al-Farabi> and Ibn 
Sina should be rejected as heretics. I want to focus on three issues, where 
the disagreement between these Islamic thinkers has implications far 
beyond the esoteric philosophical arguments being employed. In each 
case, the issues turn on the question of  the importance of  context, so 
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that whether one takes context to have epistemological significance has 
considerable consequences that reach beyond the very small group of  
philosophers and their arguments.
B. Historical Context
1. Al-Farabi
Al-Farabi>’s book, The Book of  Letters, is for the most part, a 
philosophical dictionary, listing Arabic words and how they are used in 
philosophical arguments. However, in the middle part of  the book, al-
Farabi> turns his attention to the origins of  language and the relationship 
between these origins and the disciplines of  philosophy and theology. 
For al-Farabi>, philosophy and theology cannot be properly practiced 
unless their relationship to language is also understood. That is, for al-
Farabi>, philosophy and theology are always practiced within the context 
of  language, and more precisely, a specific language. To lose sight of  this 
context, to ignore the fact that philosophers and theologians use words 
that belong to a particular language, is to invite confusion about the 
meaning of  those words, and therefore introduce confusion into their 
philosophical and theological work.
It is significant that when al-Farabi> begins his analysis of  language, 
he does not begin with language itself  but rather with a discussion of  
how people belong to a particular place.
The public and the multitude are the first to originate and come to be. 
They come to be in a specific abode and country and have by nature 
specific forms and characters in their bodies.1
Every person has a natural place and culture which is their home 
and to which their character and bodies are accustomed. Why is this 
important? Well, for al-Farabi>, when people first start to be curious 
about the world, when they first begin to think and value knowledge of  
the world, they start with what is closest to them and what is easiest to 
know.2 When thought and knowledge first appear, it is always a thinking 
and knowing about what is most accessible. In this way, knowledge of  the 
1 al-Farabi>, “The Book of  Letters”, Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings, ed. M. 
Khalidi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 4. 
2 Ibid., p. 5.
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world always begins as knowledge from a particular place and knowledge 
of  a particular place.
Not surprisingly, this has implications for al-Farabi>’s account of  
the development of  language. Adopting a classical account of  language, 
al-Farabi> takes the beginning of  language to be the intent of  one person 
wanting to communicate an idea to another person.3 For this purpose, 
people will use a sign for what is to be communicated. The sign people 
will use for communication will be a sign that imitates the thing and the 
sound used will be a sound that reflects the unique physiological qualities 
of  that group of  people.4 Initially, then, languages are dependent on the 
unique qualities of  a place in that the signs will reflect the place’s physical 
environment and the sounds will reflect the physiological makeup of  the 
people living in that place.
Inevitably, languages will change. They will develop, becoming 
more eloquent and comprehensive. A few people will notice that there 
are similarities between signs and the mode of  similarity will in turn be 
given a sign.5 In this way, a language develops the idea of  universals. 
After these universals become part of  the language, people will learn 
them and begin to study them. This in turn leads to the development of  
philosophy and religion.6 However, a different change comes when there 
is interaction between groups of  people with different languages. In this 
case, there will be the transference of  knowledge so that one group may 
adopt the religion or philosophy of  another group. The question, then, 
for al-Farabi> is whether the religion or philosophy should use the signs 
and expressions from the originating people or whether the receiving 
people should develop their own.
Here, we come up against the question of  context. If  a religious 
or philosophical idea or expression must be expressed using a particular 
language, then context is largely irrelevant. The meaning of  those words 
and expressions are not limited to a particular place or people, but rather 
somehow transcends those contexts and takes on an ahistorical, acultural 
meaning. But as we have seen, for al-Farabi>, language is always contextual. 
His advice, then, is that when religious or philosophical knowledge is 
3 Ibid., p. 5.
4 Ibid., p. 5-6.
5 Ibid., p. 15.
6 Ibid., p. 18-19.
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transferred from one group of  people to another, and it is possible, 
there should be a translation of  terms.7 If  there is a similarity between an 
expression in the first language and an expression in the second, people 
who use the second language should use the expression from their own 
language. If  there is no similar expression in the second language, people 
who use the second language should adopt the expression from the first, 
but understand the expression as being one that belongs to all languages. 
For al-Farabi>, then, it is crucial for the development of  knowledge and 
understanding, that people not mix languages, since each language 
represents a particular and unique context.
Context is crucial for al-Farabi> since all knowledge is dependent 
on the language in which it is expressed, and each language is in turn 
dependent on a particular group of  people who use the language 
in a particular place. When it comes to adopting a new religion or 
philosophy, the adoption can only happen when people find some 
way of  meaningfully translating the expressions of  that religion or 
philosophy into the expressions already present in their own language. 
For al-Farabi>, then, people, their languages and their knowledge, are 
always historically contingent, dependent on the unique particularities 
of  place and physiology.
2. Ibn Sina
Like al-Farabi>, Ibn Sina understands context as crucial for 
knowledge, but Ibn Sina, influenced by neo-Platonism, understands 
context primarily as the ground or source of  knowledge. Context, then, 
is not so much the historical development of  knowledge but rather more 
the possibility of  knowledge.
According to Ibn Sina, the rational part of  the human soul can be 
divided into a practical and theoretical faculty, both of  which are called 
intellect.8 The practical intellect concerns itself  with the body and the 
actions specific to it, such as desires, imagination and reflection. This 
practical intellect operates rationally, but also in accordance with social 
norms and values. Practical intellect acts according to principles of  reason, 
7 Ibid., p. 25.
8 Ibn Sina, “On the Soul”, in M. Khalidi, Medieval Islamic Philosophical Writings, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 27.
Phil Enns
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011 M/1432 H70
but always within the context of  the body. Practical intellect is at work 
when we reflect on what we want to do with our lives and how we will go 
about reaching our goals given the resources we have at hand and what 
is possible in the world we live in. For Ibn Sina, understanding context 
is crucial for the proper operation of  the practical intellect since what is 
possible in our lives depends on what is possible in the world we live in.
What is possible for each of  us, though, is limited by the unique 
particularities of  our physical bodies. According to Ibn Sina, each 
human being has a unique soul that is specific to that particular body 
and essentially concerned with that body.9 The soul, then, is to a degree 
dependent on the body which it animates, insofar as each human soul is 
fitted for a particular human body but also requires the activity of  that 
body for its proper operation. For Ibn Sina, though, this proper operation 
of  the soul is not limited only to the practical intellect. Ibn Sina is not a 
dualist, separating the practical intellect from the theoretical. The soul 
is one and operates properly when the practical and theoretical intellects 
work together. The practical intellect, therefore serves a dual role. First, 
as described above, the practical intellect acts as the rational guide for 
daily life. However, the practical intellect also serves as the source of  
particulars from which the theoretical intellect abstracts universals and 
their meaning.10 Just as the practical intellect is dependent on a body 
for its operation, so also is the theoretical intellect dependent on the 
practical intellect. Pure theoretical intellect cannot function on its own but 
requires practical intellect to provide the material out of  which meaning 
and universals are perceived. In this way, the theoretical intellect, via the 
practical intellect, is also dependent on the body for its proper operation, 
and therefore also dependent on context.
Ibn Sina lists four ways in which the soul is therefore dependent on 
the particulars given to it by practical intellect.11 First, our ability to know 
individual things is possible only through the experience and perception of  
particulars. From each particular, the soul abstracts universals which allow 
us to know that things are, and that there are similarities and differences. 
Second, the soul is able to recognize similarities of  relations from the 
9  Ibid., p. 44.
10 Ibid., p. 45.
11 Ibid.
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knowledge we have of  particulars in order for us to have knowledge 
of  relations between particulars. In this way, the soul is able to have 
knowledge, for example, of  causality. Third, from particulars, the soul is 
able to form empirical judgments that give us knowledge of  the nature of  
those particulars. According to Ibn Sina, the soul is therefore able to have 
knowledge, not only of  how things are at some particular time, but rather 
how things are in their nature or essence. Perception allows us to observe 
how things are while reason leads us to the judgment that some qualities 
are not arbitrary but rather belong to the nature of  the thing. Finally, the 
knowledge that comes from practical intellect is shared and agreed upon 
by groups of  people assuring the theoretical intellect that this knowledge 
has been corroborated and is therefore reliable. Knowledge of  particulars 
does not come solely from the individual but is also produced by groups 
of  people who verify judgments regarding particulars. For Ibn Sina, then, 
knowledge is dependent on both individuals, with their particular bodily 
experience of  things in the world, and larger particular groups of  people 
who, together, work to ensure that this knowledge is certain.
While Ibn Sina’s neo-Platonism leads him to conceive of  knowledge 
in a far more abstract fashion than al-Farabi>, nevertheless, like al-Farabi>, 
Ibn Sina emphasizes the importance of  context. For Ibn Sina, each human 
soul is unique and uniquely fitted for a particular body, ensuring that the 
rational activity of  the soul is likewise uniquely fitted to that body. All 
of  our knowledge is constrained by the particular characteristics of  our 
bodies. Whatever we perceive, whatever we experience, is always the 
perception and experience characteristic of  ourselves. Furthermore, what 
we perceive and experience of  things is uniquely characteristic of  those 
things. Just as each human being has a unique nature, so also do things in 
the world. In this way, no matter how abstract the knowledge, no matter 
how theoretical the reasoning, both require an empirical foundation built 
on sense perception and experience of  things in the world. And to further 
ensure that this empirical foundation is solid and that our knowledge 
is certain, there must be the corroboration of  other people. Ibn Sina’s 
account of  the fundamentally contextual nature of  all knowledge and 
reasoning therefore leads to the conclusion that, as with al-Farabi>, all 
people and their knowledge are historically contingent, dependent on 
the uniqueness of  their bodies and the people they live with.
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3. al-Ghaza>li>
In his book, The Rescuer from Error, al-Ghaza>li> details his pursuit of  
a certainty that could withstand any doubt and survive even the authority 
of  someone who could change stone into gold, or a stick into a snake.12 
In a passage that bears a striking resemblance to Descartes’ Meditations, 
al-Ghaza>li> describes how he began to examine his beliefs and finally 
came to the conclusion that they did not possess the certainty he felt was 
necessary for knowledge. Examining those beliefs that relied on sense 
perception, he concludes,
After a lengthy process of  doubt, my mind did not allow me to maintain 
my trust in sensory beliefs either, and began gradually to cast doubt on 
them, saying: “Where does this confidence in sensory beliefs come from? 
… [T]he judge of  sensation makes its judgments, but the judge of  reason 
then judges it to be false and disproves it irrefutably.”13
According to al-Ghaza>li>, the senses cannot be the source of  certain 
knowledge because the senses are frequently mistaken and need to be 
corrected by reason. It would seem, then, that reason might provide this 
foundation of  certainty. But what of  dreams? When one is dreaming, one 
believes that what is in the dream is real, and yet when we wake up we 
realize that it was not real. al-Ghaza>li> then asks, could it not be possible 
that what we are experiencing now is like a dream, and that we will soon 
wake up and realize that what reason tells us is true is only part of  the 
dream and that there is a reality different from this dream?14 al-Ghaza>li> 
then searched for a solution to these doubts, but since any solution 
required a rational proof  that started from a certainty, it became clear 
that no rational solution was possible.
But al-Ghaza>li> did not remain in this condition of  doubt. As he 
describes it, God cured him and he was able to rid himself  of  his doubts 
and once again accept and trust what he had believed before. How did this 
happen? al-Ghaza>li> makes clear that the return of  certainty was not the 
result of  proofs or arguments, but rather “by a light that God Almighty 
cast into my breast, which is the key to the greater part of  cognizance.”15 
12 Al-Ghaza>li>, “The Rescuer from Error”, in M. Khalidi (ed.), Medieval Islamic 
Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 61.
13 Ibid., p. 62.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 63.
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I don’t want to speculate on the theological implications of  this claim, 
but instead, I would like to focus on al-Ghaza>li>’s claim that knowledge 
is dependent on this ‘light’.
How then does al-Ghaza>li> understand the significance of  this 
‘light’? First, it allows him to once again believe what he had believed 
before his journey of  doubt. In other words, this ‘light’ did not lead to 
the rejection of  what he had previously known, but instead allows him 
to embrace those beliefs with a renewed certainty. However, if  this ‘light’ 
allows al-Ghaza>li> to take up what he had believed before, it does not 
allow him to return to the methods he had previously relied on to lead 
him to knowledge.
For first principles are not sought but are present, and if  what is present 
is sought it will be lost and will disappear.16
Al-Ghaza>li>’s experience of  the ‘light’ leads him, then, to the 
conclusion that certain knowledge is not only possible but available, 
yet this knowledge is not available to any method of  demonstration. 
Searching for certainty using methods of  demonstration, whether these 
be empirical or rational, only leads to doubt and the loss of  certainty. 
However, when one, like al-Ghaza>li>, abandons the methodical search for 
certainty, only then will the certainty already present in our knowledge 
be there for us. For al-Ghaza>li>, then, certain knowledge does not rely 
on proof  but rather some quality that lies within the knowledge which 
is already available to us.
If  al-Ghaza>li> rejects proof  and demonstration as means of  reaching 
knowledge, then what value is there in disciplines which rely on methods 
of  proof, such as theology and philosophy? On this point, al-Ghaza>li> 
is ambiguous. In the case of  theology, he acknowledges that there is a 
role for theology, namely preserving orthodox belief  and arguing against 
heretics.17 Having said this, however, he then dismisses theology as mere 
conformity to tradition and “of  little use for someone who only accepts 
necessary truths.”18 Theology seems to be of  value for most believers, in 
that it maintains the purity of  the faith, but if  one is seeking knowledge, 
then theology will be of  no help. The case of  philosophy is more 
16 Ibid., p. 64.
17 Ibid., p. 65.
18 Ibid.
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problematic. al-Ghaza>li> reserves his most vicious attacks for philosophy, 
which is filled with “ruses, deceptions, justifications, and illusions,”19 and 
philosophers, who are characterized as evil and malevolent.20 Yet, he also 
argues that some branches of  philosophy, for example mathematics, 
contain important knowledge, leading to two forms of  confusion. First, 
some people will be impressed with the clarity and rigor of  mathematics 
and assume that the same clarity and rigor is characteristic of  the other 
branches of  philosophy, including those parts which deny religious 
belief.21 Second, some believers will mistakenly dismiss all of  philosophy, 
including mathematics, because some philosophers deny religious belief.22 
It seems, then, that for al-Ghaza>li>, philosophy contains some elements 
worth studying but that it is generally too dangerous for the general public. 
He concludes that access to philosophical works should be restricted to 
only the few who, one assumes, are enlightened enough to recognize the 
‘deceit and danger’ of  these works.23 It seems safe to say, then, that al-
Ghaza>li> does not see the intellectual pursuits as providing much benefit to 
humanity, and what benefit they do provide is limited to either the faithful 
transmission of  tradition or the development of  forms of  knowledge, 
like mathematics, that have no relevance for religion.
The question is, then, if  al-Ghaza>li> dismisses intellectual pursuits, 
from where does knowledge come? al-Ghaza>li>’s answer is that there is 
a stage beyond the intellect whereby, in al-Ghaza>li>’s words, another eye 
is opened and it is possible to “see supernatural things, the future and 
other matters from which the intellect is isolated.”24 The intellect, with 
its dependence on proofs and methods of  demonstration, represents a 
lower level of  perception and experience that sees those things which 
are intelligible.25 However, a higher level of  perception and experience is 
found in prophecy, to use al-Ghaza>li>’s term, which allows human beings 
to see the supernatural. As noted above, the knowledge given by prophecy 
is not the result of  proofs and evidence, and so it is not appropriate to 
19 Ibid., p. 66.
20 Ibid., p. 69.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 70.
23 Ibid., p. 75.
24 Ibid., p. 83.
25 Ibid., p. 84.
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ask for evidence. How then can one be certain about this knowledge? 
al-Ghaza>li> answers that we should look for the corroboration of  a group 
of  people, instead of  individuals and particular proofs.
You will be like someone who has heard a report recurrently corroborated 
by a whole group of  people. The certainty associated with the report 
cannot be said to derive from a single specific statement, but rather in 
an indefinite way. Although it does not derive from anyone outside the 
group, it cannot be traced back to any single individual. That is robust 
knowledge-based faith.26
Al-Ghaza>li> seems to be arguing that the most reliable source of  
knowledge comes from shared belief, insofar as the knowledge does not 
depend on anything particular but rather relies on the traditions of  the 
group. Presumably, al-Ghaza>li> is arguing, in part, that knowledge which 
depends on a particular experience or argument could be mistaken, but it 
is far less likely that a group of  people would be similarly mistaken. One 
person might be confused, but how likely is it that a group of  people 
would share the identical confusion? In this way, al-Ghaza>li> argues against 
context as offering any possibility of  certain knowledge. The lesser the 
role context plays in establishing the certainty of  knowledge, the greater 
the likelihood of  its certainty.
However, al-Ghaza>li> is not simply arguing that groups are more 
reliable than individuals. He gives the example of  medicine as evidence 
of  how this mystical knowledge operates.27 According to al-Ghaza>li>, 
people cannot understand how medicine is able to restore health, but 
nevertheless they do know that certain treatments of  medications can 
cure certain illnesses. The restorative nature of  medications cannot be 
uncovered by reason. Instead, we find this knowledge passed down 
by the tradition of  doctors, which acknowledges that the medications 
work without giving proofs or explanations of  discovery. According to 
al-Ghaza>li>, this knowledge:
cannot be apprehended by the people of  intellect by dint of  reason, but 
must be acquired by conforming to the tradition of  the doctors, who in 
turn take it from the prophets, who ascertain the properties of  things on 
26 Ibid., p. 86.
27 Ibid., p. 87.
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account of  a property of  prophecy.28
It may be that groups are more reliable than individuals, but for 
al-Ghaza>li>, groups are also receptacles of  mystical knowledge and the 
means, through tradition, for disseminating that knowledge to the general 
public and passing it on to the next generation. Groups of  people, 
then, possess a shared knowledge, which originates in mystical insight, 
but has this origin erased and replaced by tradition. al-Ghaza>li>, then, 
denies context any role in relation to knowledge and certainty, going 
to the extreme of  even denying significance to the context of  mystical 
revelation. Knowledge may be the result of  a mystical moment, but 
there is no importance given to the context of  that moment. Since the 
source of  knowledge is mystical, it matters not how we come to have 
our knowledge, only that we have it. If  for al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina it is the 
philosopher who represents the heights of  knowledge, for al-Ghaza>li> it 
is the mystic, who has no name and no place.
For al-Ghaza>li>, his disagreements with al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina were 
so great that he condemns al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina as blasphemers29 and 
Muslim only in appearance30. I will leave aside their theological differences 
but instead focus on the implications of  their philosophical disagreements 
and how this can be of  use for us today. To do this, I will reflect on the 
implications both sides of  this debate have on our understanding of  
global and local context, focusing on three issues: our ability to make 
a difference, the role of  science in making a difference, and finally the 
role of  reasoning in religion to cause believers to act differently. In this 
reflection, I will make no pretence of  neutrality. I think there are good 
reasons for rejecting al-Ghaza>li>’s position and, if  not agreeing, perhaps 
being more sympathetic to the arguments of  al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina. I 
won’t present any arguments against al-Ghaza>li>, but rather try to show, on 
purely pragmatic grounds, why we ought to reject the claims of  al-Ghaza>li>.
C. History and Change
Al-Farabi> and al-Ghaza>li> represent two very different options for 
responding to local and global challenges. The choice between the two 
28 Ibid., p. 87.
29 Ibid., p. 72.
30 Ibid., p. 89.
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is a choice between making a change either by searching for something 
new or by turning back to habit. In al-Farabi>, we are shown how language 
and knowledge change through a series of  innovations that allow 
groups of  people to both develop socially and increase their knowledge 
and understanding of  the world. From the use of  sounds to represent 
things, to the introduction of  a written language, to the recognition of  
universal ideas, to the adoption of  ideas from other groups of  people, 
al-Farabi> describes the ability of  human beings to respond to local and 
global challenges as the ability to adapt and develop something new. In 
this way, local and global challenges are placed within a historical context 
that allows us to see our contemporary challenges as part of  a long line 
of  challenges that human beings have had some success in overcoming. 
Following al-Farabi>, we can understand ourselves as part of  a history of  
humanity that includes stories of  innumerable challenges in a variety of  
contexts that human beings have overcome by doing something new or 
different, often in dramatic fashion.
This approach to local and global challenges represented by al-
Farabi> stands in stark contrast to the approach represented by al-Ghaza>li>. 
For al-Ghaza>li>, there can be no history, no historical development of  
societies nor of  knowledge, because all change is supernatural in origin, 
occurring outside of  the natural order. On this account, societies and 
cultures do not change except when there is supernatural intervention 
through a prophetic word which is then deposited into the society 
or culture for safe keeping. This is an understanding of  society and 
culture as being primarily passive, so that any change, good or bad, is 
seen as coming from an outside, supernatural source. On this account, 
local and global challenges are not understood as part of  a history of  
challenges humanity has confronted and overcome, but rather as unique 
challenges imposed on this group of  people or on humanity as a whole. 
An earthquake or the eruption of  a volcano, then, is not part of  a long 
history of  natural disasters but rather a message from God. The dangers 
of  globalization are not part of  a history of  increasing inter-dependence 
of  countries and cultures, but rather a supernatural judgment on particular 
human practices. It follows, then, that if  the local and global challenges 
we face are supernatural in origin, the response must address, not the 
natural context of  those challenges, but rather their supernatural context. 
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Furthermore, this response does not require any change beyond a 
return to what has already been revealed to a people. The appropriate 
response to the earthquake or financial crisis is already known, held as 
a shared wisdom, with its prophetic origins. A change is called for, but 
it is a change that leads people to return to what they already know and 
have had revealed to them. Following al-Ghaza>li>, then, we understand 
ourselves as part of  a group that has within itself  a shared knowledge 
which provides the appropriate context for any and all local and global 
challenges.
It seems to me though that there are a number of  practical reasons 
why we should prefer a more historical approach, as seen in al-Farabi>, to 
local and global challenges. While one might agree with al-Ghaza>li> that 
groups possess a shared wisdom or knowledge, most of  the challenges 
facing us today require solutions that involve cooperation between 
groups. In these situations, individual groups cannot simply turn back 
to the way they have always done things, but must, instead, adapt to a 
new context that requires openness to the wisdom of  other groups. As 
with al-Farabi>’s account of  the development of  language, which sees 
the adoption of  ideas from other languages, so also must groups and 
societies try and find new ways of  responding to the challenges they face 
by adopting what is good and true from other societies. Put differently, 
it is unlikely that groups and societies will be successful in responding to 
the challenges of  today if  they follow the way of  thinking represented by 
al-Ghaza>li> and rely solely on their own knowledge and wisdom. Instead, 
the challenges of  today require that groups and societies work together 
to find solutions to problems that cannot be solved alone.
It also seems to be the case that history itself  has pushed aside the 
arguments of  al-Ghaza>li>. The last few hundred years in the West have seen 
discoveries and achievements that would have been unimaginable for al-
Ghaza>li>. We now have penicillin and insulin, computers and phones, the 
ability to travel to the moon and see to remote parts of  the universe. What 
has made these possible is the very sort of  method of  demonstration that 
al-Ghaza>li> rejected, namely the scientific method. al-Ghaza>li> was correct 
that this kind of  method of  producing knowledge may not provide 
an absolute degree of  certainty, but with the kinds of  discoveries and 
developments that science has given the world, al-Ghaza>li>’s argument 
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may be irrelevant. The concrete and particular benefits of  science seem 
far more real and significant for the world today than the esoteric doubts 
of  al-Ghaza>li>. The sheer magnitude of  the increase in knowledge in the 
West represents a very real and tangible obstacle to al-Ghaza>li>’s argument 
that change is primarily the consequence of  supernatural intervention. 
On the other hand, the kinds of  changes experienced by people around 
the world due to the discoveries of  science share a similarity to the 
account of  the development of  language we find in al-Farabi>, with its 
accommodation and adoption of  knowledge. In short, the events of  the 
last few centuries can be seen as evidence that, at a pragmatic level, the 
more historical approach of  al-Farabi>, with its embrace of  change and 
development, is more successful.
D. Science
From the above discussion of  history, al-Ghaza>li> appears to be not 
only on the wrong side of  history but also of  science. Given al-Ghaza>li>’s 
account of  the development of  the science of  medicine, this should not 
be surprising. For al-Ghaza>li>, neither reason nor experience can provide 
medical knowledge. Instead, knowledge of  medicine originates through 
supernatural intervention and is disseminated through the tradition of  
doctors. Doctors, then, only know that certain medications can be used 
for treating specific ailments, but they cannot know why they are effective. 
In part, this inability to know why medicine works lies in the fact that 
doctors are only working with knowledge that they have received from 
other sources, rather than from their own knowledge. However, I would 
like to suggest that, for al-Ghaza>li>, the kind of  knowledge required 
to understand the workings of  medicine is, in principle, not possible. 
According to al-Ghaza>li>, the world moves according to the will and 
command of  God instead of  according to the nature of  things in the 
world.31 That is, things in the world do not have essential qualities but 
rather only have an appearance. The essence of  a thing is not found in the 
thing but rather in God. The study of  things in the world, will therefore 
only produce knowledge of  appearances, which is why, for al-Ghaza>li>, any 
science that proceeds according to empirical study and demonstration, 
will fall short of  being legitimate knowledge.
31 Ibid., p. 71.
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This approach to science found in al-Ghaza>li> stands in contrast to 
that found in Ibn Sina. For Ibn Sina, the practical part of  the soul is able 
to perceive the universal qualities of  things and therefore understand the 
meaning of  things. In addition, this practical intellect is able to perceive 
the empirical qualities of  things so that there can be a degree of  certainty 
that what is perceived by the soul as the idea of  the thing is in fact the 
nature of  the thing. In short, for Ibn Sina, every thing in the world has 
its own unique nature, and this nature is available to human intellect 
for understanding. Furthermore, for Ibn Sina, a science that proceeds 
according to empirical testing and verification is not only possible, but 
necessary for theoretical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge, with its 
reflection on God and the higher forms, requires a solid foundation built 
on practical knowledge. Or as Ibn Sina puts it, with the affairs of  practical 
knowledge in their proper place, only then can theoretical intellect turn 
to the contemplation of  God without distraction.
The choice between the approach of  al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina on 
one hand, and al-Ghaza>li> on the other, is then, not only a choice about 
the possibility and nature of  change, but also the role of  science in that 
change. For al-Ghaza>li>, the world has a regularity and order, but this 
order is found in God, not the world. Therefore, if  one wants to respond 
to local or global challenges, one must ultimately turn ones attention to 
God. However, for Ibn Sina, the orderliness of  the world comes from 
the nature of  things. Therefore, if  one wants to respond to local or global 
challenges, one can study how things are in the world in order to find 
appropriate solutions. This should not be taken as a rejection of  God, 
since, for Ibn Sina, God is the First Cause. Rather, a scientific approach, 
with its emphasis on what is empirical and demonstrable, can provide 
solutions to challenges that are rooted in this world. Local challenges such 
as natural disasters and poverty, as well as global challenges like global 
warming, have their context within the natural world and therefore can 
find solutions in a scientific approach. And over the past few centuries, 
science has demonstrated many ways in which it can provide solutions 
to problems such as disease, natural disasters and poverty. It seems, then, 
that the approach of  al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina, with its openness to scientific 
knowledge, is the choice to be preferred, if  for no other reason than 
science has proven to be remarkably successful in providing solutions to 
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local and global challenges. However, it also seems more reasonable to 
think that the most effective solutions will be of  the same nature as the 
problem. In this way, if  we are looking for answers to local and global 
challenges that confront us in this world, we should look for answers 
that are likewise found in this world. For this reason, science must be an 
important part of  responding to those challenges which are, to at least 
some degree, rooted in natural phenomena.
E. Reason
One might, then, summarize the difference between al-Farabi> and 
Ibn Sina, on the one hand, and al-Ghaza>li> on the other, as a difference 
regarding the status of  reason. In al-Farabi>, we find a very high view of  
reason as people are able to overcome their differences and coordinate 
their actions in such a way as to achieve knowledge which is not limited 
to any specific group of  people and allows for understanding of  the 
workings of  the world. Reason plays a significant role in developing 
relationships between people and allowing them to work together as 
represented in the development of  language. Furthermore, not only does 
reason play a crucial role in the development of  language, but it also has 
a universal quality that allows for groups of  people to adopt ideas from 
other groups and languages. Reason allows individuals and groups to see 
what is common to all contexts and perceive what is universal and true in 
all cultures and languages. For al-Farabi>, then, reason is necessary for the 
development of  inter-personal relationships and knowledge of  the world.
Ibn Sina has a similarly high view of  reason. For Ibn Sina, reason 
has two important roles. The first role of  reason, through the practical 
intellect, is to provide knowledge of  the empirical world. This knowledge 
not only allows us to recognize that there is an order and structure to 
the world, but it also gives us access to universal truths found with the 
world. The second role of  reason, through the theoretical intellect, is to 
then contemplate these truths as they relate to God and higher levels of  
understanding. Like al-Farabi>, Ibn Sina sees reason as necessary for us to 
have any knowledge of  the world as well that which is beyond this world.
This high view of  reason stands in contrast to the much lower 
view found in al-Ghaza>li>. al-Ghaza>li> does not deny reason nor does he 
deny that reason can give us some kinds of  knowledge, like mathematics 
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for example. Instead, al-Ghaza>li> sees reason as providing only a limited 
knowledge of  the world or understanding of  how we should live in the 
world. As noted earlier, the knowledge found in the science of  medicine 
is not, and cannot be, the result of  reason but rather from supernatural 
sources. al-Ghaza>li> similarly dismisses the study of  politics and ethics 
as only possessing knowledge that has been taken from religion. The 
following therefore represents the summary of  al-Ghaza>li>’s view of  the 
limits of  reason:
Whoever investigates these sciences will come to know with necessity 
that they can be apprehended only by means of  divine inspiration and 
assistance from God Almighty, and that there is no way to acquire them 
by experience.32
Al-Ghaza>li> does not deny reason, but instead claims that when it 
comes to responding to local and global challenges, reason will be of  no 
use. Whether these challenges are medical, political, ethical or natural, 
the only adequate response must be one that comes from supernatural 
sources.
The choice, then, between al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina, and al-Ghaza>li> 
concerns the ability of  human beings to reason together and find 
solutions to the challenges they face in the world today. For al-Farabi> 
and Ibn Sina, people can work together to both understand the nature 
of  these challenges and find solutions. The ability to talk and provide 
reasons to one another allows for people to work together and find the 
best solutions. The ability to use reason to discover what is true and real 
allows people to find solutions that are more likely to be effective and 
successful given the conditions we live in. On the other hand, for al-
Ghaza >li>, there is no point in people working together to find solutions 
since human beings cannot discover answers by themselves. Instead, the 
best that people can do is return to how they have responded to challenges 
in the past and hope for supernatural intervention.
F. Conclusion
People disagree about the challenges, both local and global, that 
confront us today, debating the nature of  these challenges as well as their 
relative significance. In part, these disagreements will revolve around the 
32 Ibid., p. 84.
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question of  the contexts within which we understand the world around 
us. Do we understand global warming as a natural or moral phenomenon? 
Does the best response require us to return to the wisdom passed down 
through the ages or do we search for new solutions? Can we rely on 
reason to guide us or do we need something more? As I have tried to 
show above, the general forms these debates take are not unique to our 
time. In comparing al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina on one side, and al-Ghaza>li> 
on the other, I want to argue that we can find guidance on responding 
to challenges today. I have also argued that given a choice between the 
two sides, we are better off  siding with al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina.
Following al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina, we need to believe that we can 
change, adapt and find new solutions to the challenges that face us 
today. This is a pragmatic argument that brings together the practical 
observation that we need to first believe that we can change the world 
around us before we can find solutions to the problems in that world. 
In addition, the tremendous developments in the West over the last few 
centuries suggest that responding to challenges can bring about, not only 
change, but improvements in human life. Against al-Ghaza>li>, we should 
be open to the reality that, confronted with the challenges in our world 
today, we can find new ways of  living our lives that not only overcome 
problems but also improve the conditions of  our lives.
Following al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina, we need to use science to help us 
better understand the world around us. Virtually all of  the challenges that 
face us today are challenges that belong, to a greater or lesser degree, to 
the natural world. It therefore makes sense that we need to find solutions 
that are grounded in the natural world. And over the last few centuries, 
science has proven to be extraordinarily successful as a tool for finding 
solutions to problems in the natural world. Against al-Ghaza>li>, we should 
acknowledge that the scientific study of  the natural world not only yields 
knowledge, but that it can be very useful in helping human beings respond 
to the challenges they face today.
Finally, following al-Farabi> and Ibn Sina, we need to use reason to 
evaluate which solutions are the most appropriate and effective for the 
challenges facing us today. We cannot assume that there is only a single 
solution to every problem and so we need to be open to working together 
to find the best solutions. Whether it be evaluating various arguments or 
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judging the effectiveness of  different options, reason can be an effective 
tool for addressing the difficulties that human beings face today.
There may be many disagreements regarding the challenges that 
face us today, but we can be hopeful, knowing that human beings can 
respond to these challenges, using powerful tools such as science, and 
work together to find solutions that improve our lives, both locally and 
globally.
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